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Abstract
Shared caches in modern processors are vulnerable to
conflict-based attacks, whereby an attacker monitors the ac-
cess pattern of a victim by engineering cache-set conflicts.
Recent mitigations propose a randomized mapping of ad-
dresses to cache locations to obfuscate addresses that can
conflict with a target address. Unfortunately, such designs
continue to select eviction candidates from a small subset
of the resident cache lines, which makes such designs vulner-
able to algorithms that can quickly identify the conflicting
addresses.
This paper presents Mirage, a practical design for a fully
associative cache, wherein eviction candidates are selected
randomly from among all the lines resident in the cache, to be
immune to set-conflicts. A key challenge in naively adopting
such designs for large shared caches (containing tens of thou-
sands of lines) is the complexity of cache-lookup, as that can
require searching through all the lines resident in the cache in
such designs. Mirage practically enables a fully-associative
design, while maintaining the access latency similar to a tra-
ditional set-associative cache using: (1) Pointer-based indi-
rection from the tag-store to the data-store, which allows a
newly installed address to evict data of any resident line, (2)
Skewed-associative tag-store with extra invalid tags, wherein
incoming addresses can be installed without set-conflicts,
and (3) Load-aware placement that maximizes the availabil-
ity of sets with invalid tags, to eliminate set-conflicts. Our
analysis shows Mirage provides the global eviction property
of a fully-associative cache throughout the system lifetime
(violations of full-associativity, i.e set-conflicts, occur less
than once in 104 to 1017 years), offering a principled defense
against set-conflict based attacks. Mirage incurs negligible
slowdown (0.3%) and 12–15% extra storage compared to the
recently proposed Scatter-Cache.
1 Introduction
Ensuring effective data security and privacy in the context of
hardware side-channels is a challenge. Performance-critical
hardware components such as last-level caches (LLC) are
often designed as shared resources to maximize utilization.
When a sensitive application shares the LLC with a mali-
cious application running simultaneously on a different core,
cache side-channels can leak sensitive information. Such
cache attacks have been shown to leak sensitive data like en-
cryption keys [4] and user data in the cloud [32]. Set-conflict
based cache attacks (e.g. Prime+Probe [24]) are particularly
potent as they do not require any shared memory between the
victim and the spy and exploit the set-associative design of
conventional caches. Such designs map addresses to only a
small group of cache locations called a set, to enable efficient
cache lookup. If the addresses of both the victim and the at-
tacker map to the same set, then they can evict each other
from the cache (such an episode is called a set-conflict) – the
attacker uses such evictions to monitor the access pattern of
the victim.
Recent proposals for Randomized LLCs [27, 28, 38, 45]
attempt to mitigate set-conflict based attacks by randomiz-
ing the locations of cachelines, i.e. addresses resident in the
cache. By making the address-to-set mapping randomized
and unpredictable to an adversary, these designs attempt to
obfuscate the locations of the lines that are evicted. How-
ever, such defenses continue to select cachelines for eviction
from a small number of locations in the cache (equal to the
cache associativity), as shown in Figure 1(a), and thus set-
conflicts continue to occur although their locations are obfus-
cated. Subsequent attacks [26,28,39] have proposed efficient
algorithms to discover a minimal eviction-set (lines mapping
to the same set as a target address, that can evict the target via
set-conflicts) even in the presence of such defenses, render-
ing them ineffective. In this paper, we target the root cause
of vulnerability to eviction-set discovery in prior defenses –
the limitation of selecting victims for eviction from a small
subset of the cache (a few tens of lines), which allows an
adversary, that observes evictions, to learn finite information
about installed addresses.
Our goal is to eliminate set-conflicts and attacks that ex-
ploit them, with a cache that has the property of global evic-
tions, i.e the victims for eviction are chosen (randomly) from
among all the lines in the cache. With global evictions, any
line resident in the cache can get evicted when a new address
is installed into the cache; all cachelines belong to a single
set as shown in Figure 1(b). Hence, an adversary observing
an eviction of its address gains no information about the in-
stalled address.
A fully associative cache design, where an address can
map to any location in the cache, naturally provides global
evictions. However, the main challenge in adopting such a de-
sign for the LLC is ensuring practical cache lookup. As a line
can reside in any cache location, a cache lookup can require
searching through the entire LLC (containing tens of thou-
sands of lines) and be much slower than even a memory ac-
cess. In contrast, a set-associative design has efficient lookup,
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Figure 1: (a) Traditional LLCs have set-associative evictions (SAE), which leaks information to a spy. (b) Desired abstraction:
Global Evictions (GLE) on misses that avoid set conflicts. (c) Our proposal, Mirage, enables global evictions practically with:
(1) Indirection from tag-store to the data-store, (2) Skewed-Associative tag-store with extra tags, and (3) Placement of lines
with load-balancing that guarantees the availability of sets with invalid tags and eliminates SAE.
as it searches through only the lines within a set (typically 8 –
32 lines). Ideally, we want the security of a fully-associative
design, but the practical lookup of a set-associative design.
To this end, we proposeMirage (Multi-Index Randomized
Cache with Global Evictions). The key insight in Mirage is
the decoupling of placement of a new line in the tag-store
(where the metadata is stored, that determines the complexity
of lookup), from the replacement decisions (which locations
should be evicted to free up capacity in the data-store). This
allows the placement of the tag of the line in a small num-
ber of possible locations in the tag-store for efficient lookup,
while selecting data victims globally from the entire data-
store.
To enable global evictions, Mirage uses pointer-based in-
direction to associate tags with data-blocks and vice-versa
(inspired by V-way Cache [29]), as shown in Figure 1(c). Un-
like a traditional cache, this design does not have an implicit
mapping between the tag and the data for a cacheline. Mi-
rage provisions extra invalid tags for each set in the tag-store
at a modest storage cost, while retaining the same data-store
capacity. When a new line is installed, an invalid tag can be
allocated from the tag-store without requiring an eviction of
a line from the same set. An eviction of a line is only required
to free up a data-block, which is selected randomly from all
the lines in the data-store, thus providing global eviction.
It is essential to prevent the adversary from mapping sev-
eral lines at a time to a specific set, to fully deplete the avail-
able tags in that set. On an install to such a fully-occupied
set, the cache is forced to perform a Set Associative Evic-
tion (SAE), where a valid tag from the same set needs to
be evicted to accommodate the incoming line. By observ-
ing such an SAE, an adversary can infer the address of the
installed line causing the eviction, and eventually launch a
set-conflict based attack.
To eliminate set-conflicts and SAE, and ensure all evic-
tions are global evictions, Mirage first splits the tag store in
two equal parts (skews), and uses a cryptographic hash func-
tion to randomize the line-to-set mapping within each skew,
like prior skewed-associative designs for secure caches [28,
45]. This allows a line the flexibility of mapping to two pos-
sible sets (one in each skew), in a manner unpredictable to
the adversary. As both skews could have invalid tag-store en-
tries, an important consideration is the skew-selection policy
on a line-install. Using a random skew-selection policy, such
as in prior works [28, 45], results in an unbalanced distribu-
tion of invalid tags across sets, causing the episodes of SAE
to continue to occur every few microseconds (few thousand
line installs). To promote a balanced distribution of invalid
tags across sets,Mirage employs a load-aware skew selection
policy (inspired by load-aware hashing [3, 31]), that chooses
the skew with the most invalid tag-entries in the given set.
With this policy, Mirage guarantees an invalid tag is always
available for an incoming line for system lifetime, thus elim-
inating SAE.
For an LLC with 2MB/core capacity and 16-ways in the
baseline, Mirage provisions 75% extra tags, and has two
skews, each containing 14-ways of tag-store entries. Our
analysis shows that such a design encounters SAE once per
1017 years, providing the global eviction property and an illu-
sion of a fully associative cache virtually throughout system
lifetime.
If Mirage is implemented with fewer than 75% extra tags,
the probability of an SAE increases as the likelihood that the
tag entries in both skews are all valid increases. To avoid an
SAE in such cases, we propose an optimization that relocates
an evicted tag to its alternative set that is likely to have in-
valid tags with high probability (note that each address maps
to two sets, one in each skew). Mirage equipped with such
Cuckoo Relocation (inspired from cuckoo hashing [25]), en-
sures an SAE occurs once every 22,000 years, with 50% ex-
tra tags.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions:
1. We observe that conflict based cache attacks can be mit-
igated by having global eviction, that considers all the
lines for eviction. For practical adoption, our goal is pro-
vide such a global eviction property without incurring
significant latency for cache-lookup or power overhead.
2. We propose Mirage, a practical way to get the global
eviction benefits of a fully associative cache. Mirage
uses indirection from tag-store to data-store, an intelli-
gent tag store design, and a load balancing policy to en-
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sure that the cache provides global evictions for system
lifetime (set-associative evictions occur once in 1017
years).
3. We propose Mirage with Cuckoo Relocation, whereby
set-associative evictions in the tag store are mitigated
by relocating a conflicting entry to an alternative loca-
tion. This ensures set-associative evictions occur once
in 22,000 years while reducing the extra tags needed.
As Mirage requires extra tags and indirection, it incurs a
modest storage overhead of 12% to 15% for a cache design
with 64-byte linesize (the storage overhead halves at 128-
byte linesize). Our evaluations with a hardware-performance
simulator show that Mirage incurs negligible slowdown
(0.3%) compared to recently proposed Scatter-Cache. With
these modest costs, Mirage provides the property of global
evictions virtually for system lifetime, providing principled
security against conflict-based attacks, and remains robust re-
gardless of the advances in the algorithms for forming evic-
tion sets.
2 Background and Motivation
2.1 Threat Model
We assume a threat model where the attacker and victim ex-
ecute on different physical cores of a system and share a
last-level cache (LLC) that is inclusive of the L1/L2 caches,
which are private to each core. We primarily focus on cache
side-channel attacks where the attacker causes set-conflicts
to evict the target line in order to monitor the access pat-
tern of the co-running victim. Such attacks are potent as they
do not require the victim and the attacker to access lines in
shared memory. For simplicity, we assume no shared mem-
ory between the victim and the attacker as there are exist-
ing solutions [45] that are effective at mitigating attacks on
shared lines.1
2.2 Problem: Conflict-Based Cache Attacks
Without loss of generality, we describe the Prime+Probe at-
tack [24] as an example of conflict-based cache attack. As
shown in Figure 2, the attacker first primes a set with its ad-
dresses, then allows the victim to execute and evict an at-
tacker line due to cache-conflicts. Later, the attacker probes
the addresses to check if there is a miss, to infer that the
victim accessed that set. Prior attacks have monitored ad-
dresses accessed in AES T-table and RSA Square-Multiply
Algorithms to leak secret keys [21], addresses accessed in
DNN computations to leak DNN model parameters [48], etc.
1If the attacker and the victim have shared-memory, attacks such as
Flush+Reload or Evict+Reload are possible. These can be mitigated by stor-
ing duplicate copies of shared-addresses, as proposed in Scatter-Cache [45].
We discuss how our design can incorporate this mitigation in Section 5.4.
To launch such attacks, the attacker first needs to generate
an eviction-set for a victim address, i.e. a minimal set of ad-
dresses mapping to the same cache set as the victim address.
Set-0
Set-1
A B A X A
Attacker
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Miss for B leaks
victim access
Victim 
Accesses  X
Attacker 
Primes
Installs A,B
B
Evicts B
Prime+Probe Attack
EvictionSet (X) 
= {A,B}
Requires 
discovery of
Lines that can 
evict X
Figure 2: Example of Conflict-Based Attack (Prime+Probe).
2.3 Recent Advances in Attacks and Defenses
Given how critical eviction-set discovery is for such attacks,
recent defense works have proposed randomized caches to
obfuscate the address to set mapping and make it harder to
learn eviction sets. At the same time, recent attacks have con-
tinued to enable faster algorithms for eviction set discovery.
We describe the key related works in this spirit and discuss
the pitfalls of continuing with such an approach.
Move-1: Attack by Eviction Set Discovery in O(n2)
Typically, set-selection functions in caches are undocu-
mented. A key work by Liu et al. [21] proposed an algorithm
to discover eviction-sets without the knowledge of the ad-
dress to set mappings – it tests and eliminates addresses one
at a time, requiring O(n2) accesses to discover an eviction-
set.
Move-2: Defense via Encryption and Remapping
CEASER [27] (shown in Figure 3(a)) proposed randomiz-
ing the address to set mapping by accessing the cache with an
encrypted line address. By enabling dynamic re-keying, it en-
sures that the mapping changes before an eviction-set can be
discovered with an algorithm that requires O(n2) accesses.
(a) CEASER
Scatter-Cache,
CEASER-S
S
e
ts
(b)  
fLine
Address
Skews
f1
ways S0
f2
S1
Line
Address
Figure 3: Recent Works on Randomized Caches
Move-3: Attack by Eviction Set Discovery in O(n)
Subsequent works [28, 39] developed a faster algorithm
that could discover eviction-sets in O(n) accesses, by elim-
inating groups of lines from the set of potential candidates,
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Figure 4: (a) Mirage provides the abstraction of a fully-associative design with globally random evictions. (b) It achieves this
by using extra tags and indirection between tags and data-blocks, skewed-indexing, and load-aware skew-selection, to enable
fully-associative evictions while retaining set-indexed cache lookup.
rather than one line at a time. CEASER is unable to pre-
vent eviction-set discovery with such faster algorithms, as its
remapping rate needs to be increased beyond practical limits.
Move-4: Defense via Skewed Associativity
Scatter-Cache [45] and CEASER-S [28] adopt skewed as-
sociativity in addition to randomized mapping of addresses
to sets, to further obfuscate the LLC evictions. As shown
in Figure 3(b), such designs partition the cache across ways
into multiple skews, with each skew having a different set-
mapping and a new address is installed in a randomly se-
lected skew. Such a design provides greater obfuscation as
eviction sets get decided by the line to skew mapping as well.
These designs were shown to be immune to faster eviction
set discovery algorithms [28, 39] that require O(n) steps.
Move-5: Attack by Probabilistic Eviction Set Discovery
A recent work [26] showed that faster eviction-set discov-
ery in Scatter-Cache is possible with an intelligent choice
of initial conditions, that boosts the probability of observ-
ing conflicts in Scatter-Cache. This allows discovery of par-
tial eviction-sets (lines that evict a target in a subset of the
ways) within 140K accesses in Scatter-Cache, that can en-
able a conflict-based attack. We believe this attack can also
target CEASER-S, as conceptually it has a similar design as
Scatter-Cache.
Pitfalls: There is an interplay between robustness of de-
fenses and algorithms for eviction set discovery. The security
of past defenses has hinged on obfuscation of eviction-sets,
i.e. making them harder to discover with existing algorithms.
However, newer algorithms enabling faster eviction-set dis-
covery continue to break such defenses. Ideally, we seek a de-
fense that eliminates Set-Associative Evictions (SAE), which
are the root-cause of the vulnerability, as they allow the ad-
versary to learn eviction-sets. Eliminating SAE would not
only safe-guard against current algorithms for eviction set
discovery but also against a hypothetical oracular algorithm
that can learn an eviction-set after observing just a single con-
flict.
2.4 Goal: A Practical Fully-Associative LLC
As a principled defense against conflict based attacks, we
seek to design a cache that provides Global Eviction (GLE),
i.e. the eviction candidates are selected from among all of
the addresses resident in the cache when new addresses are
installed. Such a defense would eliminate SAE and be im-
mune to eviction-set discovery and conflict based attacks, as
evicted addresses are independent of the addresses installed
and leak no information about installed addresses. While
a fully-associative design provides global evictions, it has
prohibitive overheads in terms of access latency and power
when adopted for an LLC.2 The goal of our paper is to enable
an LLC design that guarantees all evictions are global evic-
tions, while retaining the practical lookup of a set-associative
cache.
3 Full Associativity via MIRAGE
To guarantee global evictions in a practical manner, we pro-
pose Mirage (Multi-Index Randomized Cache with Global
Evictions). Mirage provides the abstraction of a fully associa-
tive cache with random replacement, as shown in Figure 4(a).
This design has the property that on a cache miss, a random
line is evicted from among all resident lines in the cache.
This ensures that the evicted victim is independent of the
incoming line and no subset of lines in the cache form an
eviction set.
3.1 Overview of Mirage
Mirage has three key components, as shown in Figure 4(b).
The first component is a cache organization that decouples
tag and data location and uses indirection to link tag and data
entries, as indicated by 1 in Figure 4(b). Provisioning ex-
tra invalid tags allows accommodating new lines in indexed
2Recent works propose fully-associative designs to eliminate eviction-
sets for a subset of the cache (Hybcache [7]) or for small L1-Caches (RP-
Cache [42], NewCache [43]). But applying them to large LLCs is imprac-
tical as they incur high latency/power overheads. We describe these in Sec-
tion 9.1.
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sets without tag-conflicts, and indirection between tags and
data-blocks allows victim-selection from the data-store in a
global manner. The second component of Mirage is an in-
telligent tag-store design that splits the tag entries into two
structures (skews) and accesses each of them with a different
hashing function, as indicated by 2 in Figure 4(b). Finally,
to maximize the likelihood of getting an invalid tag on cache-
install, Mirage uses an intelligent load-balancing policy for
skew-selection leveraging the "power of 2 choices" [31] as
indicated by 3 in Figure 4(b), which ensures that no SAE
occurs in system lifetime and all evictions are global. We de-
scribe each component next.
3.2 Tag-to-Data Indirection and Extra Tags
Figure 5 shows the tag and data store organization using
pointer-based indirection in Mirage. This design is inspired
by the V-way cache [29] that originally used it to reduce
conflict-misses in LLCs and improve performance. Here, the
tag-store is over-provisioned to include extra invalid tags,
which can accommodate the metadata of a new line (i.e.
the address, valid-bit,dirty-bit, etc.) without a set-associative
eviction (SAE). Each tag-store entry has a pointer (FPTR) to
allow it to map to an arbitrary data-store entry.3 On a cache-
miss, two types of evictions are possible: if the incoming line
finds an invalid tag, a Global Eviction (GLE) is performed;
otherwise, an SAE is performed to invalidate a tag in the set
where the line is to be installed (alongwith the correspond-
ing data-entry). For a GLE, a random data entry from the
entire data-store is selected (using a hardware PRNG) and
the tag associated with this line is invalidated using the re-
verse pointer (RPTR) stored with each data entry. In either
case, the RPTR in the invalidated data-entry is reset to an in-
valid value. This data-entry and the invalid tag-entry in the
original set are then used by the new line to be installed.
Although indirection and extra tags enable GLE, they are
by themselves insufficient to eliminate SAE. For example, if
an adversary has arbitrary control over the placement of new
lines in specific sets, they can map a large number of lines
to a certain set and deplete the extra invalid tags provisioned
in that set. When a new (victim) line is to be installed to this
set, the cache is then forced to evict a valid tag from the same
set and incur an SAE. Thus, an adversary who can discover
the address to set mapping can force an SAE on each miss,
making such a design vulnerable to the same attacks present
in conventional set-associative caches.
3.3 Skewed-Associative Tag-Store Design
To virtually eliminate SAE and ensure GLE on each line in-
stall, Mirage reshapes the tag organization. To offer flexi-
3While indirection requires a cache lookup to serially access the tag and
data entries, commercial processors [1, 9, 44] since the last two decades al-
ready employ such serial tag and data access for the LLC to save power (this
allows the design to only access the data-way corresponding to the hit).
Tag-Store
Data
Store
S
e
ts
 
extraWays
Global
Eviction
}
RPTRData
Tag FPTRInstall in 
Invalid-Tag
Figure 5: Overview of the cache substrate used by Mirage
with indirection and extra tags (inspired by V-Way Cache).
bility for a new address to map to multiple sets in the tag
store and increase the probability of obtaining an invalid
tag, Mirage architects the tag-store as a skewed-associative
structure [35]. Here, the tag store is split into two parti-
tions or skews, and a different randomizing hash function
is used to map addresses to sets in each skew as shown
in Figure 4. The hash function to map addresses-to-sets is
constructed using QARMA-64 [2] block-cipher, similar to
Scatter-Cache (SCv1) [45], with each skew using a differ-
ent 64-bit key. Note that, unlike prior defenses using skewed-
associativity [28,45], each tag-store skew in Mirage contains
invalid tag-entries. Offering the flexibility for a new line to
map to two sets (one in each skew) in the presence of in-
valid entries, significantly increases the chance of finding an
invalid tag in which it can be installed and avoiding an SAE.
Moreover, as the adversary does not know the secret key and
the address-to-set mapping, they cannot arbitrarily deplete
these invalid tags within a set.
3.4 Load-Aware Skew Selection
An adversary may attempt to exploit natural imbalance in
usage of tags across sets and observe resultant SAE to
learn the address-to-set mappings. On a line-install, the
skew-selection policy, that decides the skew in which the
line is installed, determines the distribution of invalid tags
across all sets. Prior works, including Scatter-Cache [45] and
CEASER-S [28], use a random skew selection policy, that
randomly picks one of the two skews on a line-install. In the
presence of invalid tags, this policy is prone to having imbal-
anced sets, some with few tags in use and some with all the
tags in use. Our analysis indicates that such a random skew-
selection policy results in an SAE every few misses (every
2600 misses with 6 extra ways/skew), and provides robust-
ness only for microseconds.
To guarantee the availability of invalid tags in every set
and eliminate SAE, Mirage uses a load-aware skew selection
policy inspired from "Power of 2 Choices" [3, 31], a load-
balancing technique used in hash-tables. As indicated by 3
in Figure 4, this policy makes an intelligent choice between
the two skews, installing the line in the skew where the in-
dexed set has a higher number of invalid tags. In the case
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of a tie between the two sets, one of the two skews is ran-
domly selected. With this policy, an SAE occurs only if the
indexed sets in both skews do not have invalid tags, that is
a rare occurrence as this policy actively promotes balanced
usage of tags across sets. Table 1 shows the rate of SAE for
Mirage with load-aware skew selection policy, as the number
of extra tags per skew is increased from 0 to 6. Mirage with
14-ways per skew (75% extra tags) encounters an SAE once
in 1034 cache-installs, or equivalently 1017 years, ensuring no
SAE throughout the system lifetime. We derive these bounds
analytically in Section 4.3.
Table 1: Frequency of Set-Associative Eviction (SAE) in Mi-
rage as number of extra ways-per-skew is increased (assum-
ing 16-MB LLC with 16-ways in the baseline and 1ns per
install)
Ways in each Skew
Installs per SAE Time per SAE
(Base + Extra)
8 + 0 1 1 ns
8 + 1 4 4 ns
8 + 2 60 60 ns
8 + 3 8000 8 us
8 + 4 2×108 0.16 s
8 + 5 7×1016 2 years
8 + 6 (default Mirage) 1034 1017 years
4 Security Analysis of Mirage
In this section, we analyze set-conflict-based attacks in
a setting where the attacker and the victim do not have
shared memory (shared-memory attacks are analyzed in
Section 5.4). All existing set-conflict based attacks, such
as Prime+Probe [24], Prime+Abort [8], Evict+Time [24],
etc. exploit eviction-sets to surgically evict targeted victim-
addresses, and all eviction-set discovery algorithms require
the attacker to observe evictions dependent on the addresses
accessed by the victim. In Mirage, two types of evictions
are possible – a global eviction, where the eviction candi-
date is selected randomly from all the lines in the data-store,
that leak no information about installed addresses; or a set-
associative eviction (SAE), where the eviction candidate is
selected from the same set as the installed line due to a tag-
conflict, that leaks information. To justify how Mirage elim-
inates conflict-based attacks, in this section we estimate the
rate of SAE and reason that even a single SAE is unlikely to
occur in system-lifetime.
Our security analysis makes the following assumptions:
1. Set-index derivation functions are perfectly random
and the keys are secret. This ensures the addresses
are uniformly mapped to cache-sets, in a manner un-
known to the adversary, so that they cannot directly in-
duce SAE. Also, themappings in different skews (gener-
ated with different keys) are assumed to be independent,
as required for the power of 2-choices load-balancing.
2. Even a single SAE is sufficient to break the secu-
rity. The number of accesses required to construct an
eviction-set has reduced due to recent advances, with
the state-of-the-art [21, 28, 39] requiring at least a few
hundred set-associative evictions to construct eviction-
sets. To mitigate even future advances in eviction-set
discovery, we consider a powerful hypothetical adver-
sary that can construct an eviction-set with a single
SAE (the theoretical minimum), unlike previous de-
fenses [27, 28, 45] that only consider existing eviction-
set discovery algorithms.
4.1 Bucket-And-Balls Model
To estimate the rate of SAE, we model the operation of Mi-
rage as a buckets-and-balls problem, as shown in Figure 6.
Here each bucket models a cache-set and each ball throw rep-
resents a new address installed into the cache. Each ball picks
from 2 randomly chosen buckets, one from each skew, and
is installed in the bucket with more free capacity, modeling
the skew-selection in Mirage. If both buckets have the same
number of balls, one of the two buckets is randomly picked.4
If both buckets are full, an insertion will cause a bucket spill,
equivalent to an SAE in Mirage. Otherwise, on every ball
throw, we randomly remove a ball from among all the balls
in buckets to model Global Eviction. The parameters of our
model are shown in Table 6. We initialize the buckets by in-
serting as many balls as cache capacity (in number of lines),
and then perform 10 trillion ball insertions and removals to
measure frequency of bucket spills (equivalent to SAE). Note
that having fewer lines in the cache than the capacity is detri-
mental to an attacker, as the probability of a spill would be
lower; so we model the best-case scenario for the attacker.
Table 2: Parameters for Buckets and Balls Modeling
Buckets and Balls Model Mirage Design
Balls - 256K Cache Size - 16 MB
Buckets/Skew - 16K Sets/Skew - 16K
Skews - 2 Skews - 2
Avg Balls/Bucket - 8 Avg Data-Lines Per Set - 8
Bucket Capacity - 8 to 14 Ways Per Skew - 8 to 14
4A biased tie-breaking policy [40] that always picks Skew-1 on ties fur-
ther reduces the frequency of bucket-spills by few orders of magnitude com-
pared to random tie-breaks. However, to keep our analysis simple, we use a
random tie-breaking policy.
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B1 (i)
B2 (i)
Buckets
}
in B1 : if Balls[B1 ] < Balls[B2 ]
in B2 : if Balls[B1 ] > Balls[B2 ]
in rand(B1 , B2 ) : if both equal
random ball: 
from all balls in Buckets 
Insert-Ball (i) Remove-Ball (i)
ith insertion ith removal
Figure 6: Buckets-and-balls model for Mirage with 32K
buckets (divided into 2 skews), holding 256K balls in total
to model a 16MB cache. The bucket capacity is varied from
8-to-14 to model 8-to-14 ways per skew in Mirage.
4.2 Empirical Results for Frequency of Spills
Figure 7 shows the average number of balls thrown per
bucket spill, analogous to the number of line installs required
to cause an SAE on average. As bucket capacity increases
from 8 to 14, there is a considerable reduction in the fre-
quency of spills. When the bucket capacity is 8, there is a
spill on every throw as each bucket has 8 balls on average.
As bucket capacity increases to 9 / 10 / 11 / 12, the spill fre-
quency decreases to once every 4 / 60 / 8000 / 160Mn balls.
For bucket capacities of 13 and 14, we observe no bucket
spills even after 10 trillion ball throws. These results show
that as the number of extra tags increases, the probability of
an SAE in Mirage decreases super-exponentially (better than
squaring on every extra way). With 12 ways/skew (50% extra
tags), Mirage has an SAE every 160 million installs (equiva-
lent to every 0.16 seconds).
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Figure 7: Frequency of bucket spills, as bucket capacity is
varied. As bucket-capacity increases from 8 to 14 (i.e. extra-
tags per set increase from 0% to 75%), bucket spills (equiva-
lent to SAE) become more infrequent.
While this empirical analysis is useful for estimating the
probability of an SAE with up to 12 ways/skew, increasing
the ways/skew further makes the frequency of SAE super-
exponentially less. Hence, it is impractical to empirically
compute the probability of SAE in a reasonable amount of
time beyond 12 ways/skew (an experiment with 10 trillion
ball throws already takes a few days to simulate). To esti-
mate the probability of SAE for a Mirage design with 14
ways/skew, we develop an analytical model, as described in
the next section.
Table 3: Terminology used in the analytical model
Symbol Meaning
Pr(n= N) Probability that a Bucket contains N balls
Pr(n≤ N) Probability that a Bucket contains ≤ N balls
Pr(X → Y ) Probability that a Bucket with X balls transitions to Y balls
W Capacity of a Bucket (beyond which there is a spill)
Btot Total number of Buckets (32K)
btot Total number of Balls (256K)
4.3 Analytical Model for Bucket Spills
To estimate the probability of bucket spills analytically, we
start by modeling the behavior of our buckets and balls sys-
tem in a spill-free scenario (assuming unlimited capacity
buckets). We model the bucket-state, i.e. the number of balls
in a bucket, as a Birth-Death chain [19], a type of Markov
chain where the state-variable (number of balls in a bucket)
only increases or decreases by 1 at a time due to birth or death
events (ball insertion or deletions), as shown in Figure 8.
 N 
balls
 N + 1
balls
 N - 1
balls
 N + 2
balls
Pr (N + 1 → N)
Pr (N → N + 1)
Figure 8: Bucket state modeled as a Birth-Death chain, a
Markov Chain where the state variable N (number of balls
in a bucket) increases or decreases by one at a time, due to a
birth (insertion) or death (deletion) of a ball.
We use a classic result for Birth-Death chains, that in
the steady-state, the probability of each state converges to a
steady value and the net rate of conversion between any two
states becomes zero. Applying this result to our model in Fig-
ure 8, we can equate the probability of a bucket with N balls
transitioning to N+1 balls and vice-versa to get Equation 1.
The terminology used in our model is shown in Table 3.
Pr(N→ N+ 1) = Pr(N+ 1→ N) (1)
To calculate Pr(N→ N+ 1), we note that a bucket with N
balls transitions to N+1 balls on a ball insertion if: (1) the
buckets chosen from both Skew-1 and Skew-2 have N balls;
or (2) bucket chosen from Skew-1 has N balls and from
Skew-2 has more than N balls; or (3) bucket chosen from
Skew-2 has N balls and from Skew-1 has more than N balls.
Thus, if the probability of a bucket with N balls is Pr(n= N),
probability that it transitions to N+1 balls is given by Equa-
tion 2.
Pr(N→N+1)=Pr(n=N)2+2∗Pr(n=N)∗Pr(n>N) (2)
To calculate Pr(N+ 1→ N), we note that a bucket with
N+1 balls transitions to N balls only on a ball removal. As
a random ball is selected for removal from all the balls, the
probability that a ball in a bucket with N+1 balls is selected
for removal equals the fraction of balls in such buckets. If the
number of buckets equals Btot and the number of balls is btot ,
the probability of a bucket with N+ 1 balls losing a ball (i.e.
the fraction of balls in such buckets), is given by Equation 3.
Pr(N+ 1→ N) =
Pr(n = N+ 1)∗Btot ∗ (N+ 1)
btot
(3)
Combining Equation 1, 2 and 3, and placing Btot/btot =
1/8, (the number of buckets/balls) we get the probability of
a bucket with N+1 balls, as given by Equation 4 and 5.
Pr(n=N+1)=
8
N+1
∗
(
Pr(n=N)2
+2∗Pr(n=N)∗Pr(n>N)
) (4)
=
8
N+1
∗
(
Pr(n=N)2+2∗Pr(n=N)
−2∗Pr(n=N)∗Pr(n≤N)
) (5)
As n grows, Pr(n= N)→ 0 and Pr(n> N)≪ Pr(n= N)
given our empirical observation that these probabilities re-
duce super-exponentially. Using these conditions Equation 4
can be simplified to Equation 6 for larger n.
Pr(n= N+ 1) =
8
N+ 1
∗Pr(n= N)2 (6)
From our simulation of 10 trillion balls, we obtain proba-
bility of a bucket with no balls as Probs (n= 0) = 4× 10
−6.
Using this value in Equation 5, we recursively calculate
Prest(n = N+ 1) for N ∈ [1,10] and then use Equation 6 for
N ∈ [11,14], when the probabilities become less than 0.01.
Figure 9 shows the empirically observed (Probs) and analyti-
cally estimated (Prest ) probability of a bucket having N balls.
Prest matches Probs for all available data-points.
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Figure 9: Probability of a Bucket having N balls – Estimated
analytically (Prest ) and Observed (Probs)
Figure 9 shows that the probability of a set having N lines
decreases double-exponentially beyond 8 lines per set (the
average number of data-lines per set). For N = 13 / 14 / 15,
the probability reaches 10−8 / 10−17 / 10−34. This behavior
is due to two reasons – (a) for a set to get to N+1 lines, a
new line must map to two sets with at least N lines; (b) a
set with a higher number of lines is more likely lose a line
due to random global eviction. Using these probabilities, we
estimate the frequency of SAE in the next section.
4.4 Analytical Results for Frequency of Spills
For a bucket of capacity W, the spill-probability (without
relocation) is the probability that a bucket with W balls
gets to W + 1 balls. By setting N =W in Equation 2 and
Pr(n>W ) = 0, we get the spill-probability as Equation 7.
Prspill = Pr(W →W + 1) = Pr(n =W )
2
(7)
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Figure 10: Frequency of bucket-spill, as bucket-capacity
varies – both analytically estimated (Balls/Spillest ) and em-
pirically observed (Balls/Spillobs) results are shown.
Figure 10 shows the frequency of bucket-spills (SAE) es-
timated by using Prest (n=W ), from Figure 9, in Equation 7.
The estimated values (Balls/Spillest ) closely matches the em-
pirically observed values (Balls/Spillobs) from Section 4.2.
As the number of tags per set, i.e. bucket-capacity (W ) in-
creases, the rate of SAE, i.e. the frequency of bucket-spills
shows a double-exponential reduction (which means the ex-
ponent itself is increasing exponentially). The probability of
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a spill with x extra ways, is of the form P(2
x); therefore with
5-6 extra ways, we get an extremely small probability of spill
as the exponent term reaches 32 – 64. ForW = 12 / 13 / 14, an
SAE occurs every 108 / 1016 / 1034 line installs. Thus, the de-
fault Mirage design with 14-ways per set, with a rate of one
SAE in 1034 line installs (i.e. once in 1017 years), effectively
provides the security of a fully associative cache.
5 Discussion
5.1 Key Management in Mirage
Mirage uses secret keys for the set-index derivation function,
that are stored in hardware and not visible to any software
including the OS. Mirage does not require keys to be pro-
visioned per-process/domain (unlike [45]) and does not re-
quire key-refreshes (unlike [27, 28]). While device-specific
keys could be fused into the hardware, we recommend that
the keys are generated at boot-time locally within the cache
controller (using a pseudorandom number generator in hard-
ware) to guard against inadvertent key leakage. For example,
if the keys leak or the adversary guesses the key (1 in 264
chance), that breaks all prior secure cache designs, Mirage
can still detect such attacks, as SAE are required to orches-
trate conflicts, which are not expected during regular oper-
ation. If multiple SAE are encountered, indicating that the
mapping is no longer secret, then the keys in Mirage can be
refreshed (followed by cache flush) to ensure continued se-
curity.
5.2 Security for Sliced LLC Designs
Recent Intel CPUs provision LLCs that are made up of
smaller physically distinct entities called slices, that are each
a few MBs in size, with separate tag-store and data-store
structures per slice. In such designs, Mirage can be imple-
mented at the granularity of a slice (with per-slice keys) and
can guarantee global evictions within each slice. We ana-
lyzed the rate of SAE for an implementation of Mirage per
2MB slice (2048 sets, as used in Intel CPUs), with the tag-
store per slice having 2 skews and 14-ways per skew and ob-
served it to be one SAE in 2× 1017 years, whereas a mono-
lithic 16MBMirage provides a rate of once in 5×1017 years.
Thus, both designs (monolithic and per-slice) provide protec-
tion for a similar order of magnitude (and well beyond the
system lifetime).
5.3 Security as Baseline Associativity Varies
The rate of SAE strongly depends on the number of ways
provisioned in the tag-store. Table 4 shows the rate of SAE
for a 16MB LLC, as the baseline associativity varies from
8 ways – 32 ways. As the baseline associativity varies, with
just 1 extra way per skew, the different configurations have
an SAE every 13 – 14 installs. However, adding each extra
way squares the rate successively as per Equation 7. Follow-
ing the double-exponential curve of Figure 10, the rate of an
SAE goes beyond once in 1013 years (well beyond system
lifetime) for all three configurations within 5–6 extra ways.
Table 4: Cacheline installs Per SAE in Mirage as the baseline
associativity of the LLC tag-store varies
LLC Associativity 8-ways 16-ways (default) 32-ways
1 extra way/skew 13 (< 20ns) 14 (< 20ns) 14 (< 20ns)
5 extra ways/skew 1021 (104 yrs) 1016 (2 yrs) 1014 (8 days)
6 extra ways/skew 1043 (1026 yrs) 1034 (1017 yrs) 1030 (1013 yrs)
5.4 Mitigating Shared-Memory Attacks
Thus far, we have focused primarily on attacks that
cause eviction via set conflicts and without any shared
data between the victim and the attacker. If there is
shared-memory between the victim and the attacker,
attacks such as Flush +Reload [51], Flush+Flush [13],
Invalidate+Transfer [16], Flush+Prefetch [12],
Thrash+Reload [34], Evict+Reload [14] etc. are possi-
ble, where an attacker evicts the shared line from the
cache using clflush instruction or cache-thrashing [34] or
eviction-sets [14], and measures the latency of subsequent
loads or flushes [13] of that line.
Shared Read-only Memory: These attacks are easily miti-
gated for read-only memory by placing distrusting programs
(i.e. victim and attacker) in different security domains and
storing duplicate copies of the shared line in the cache for
each security domains, as adopted in several prior works [7,
18, 45]. For example, Scatter-Cache (SCv1) [45] uses the
Domain-ID as an input to the hash-functions used for set-
index-derivation, to ensure a shared address maps to different
cache locations for different domains. Mirage uses an iden-
tical hash-function construction as Scatter-Cache SCv1, and
hence inherits this feature that mitigates these attacks. We
refer the reader to Scatter-Cache [45] for a detailed analysis
of this mitigation.
Shared Writable Memory: It is infeasible to store du-
plicate copies in the cache for writable memory shared
across domains, as such a design is incompatible with cache-
coherence protocols. For security in this scenario, we require
that writable shared-memory is only used for data-transfer
between the victim and the attacker and not for any sensitive
computations, a similar assumption as Scatter-Cache [45].
5.5 Implications for Other Cache Attacks
Replacement Policy Attacks:Reload+Refresh [6] attack ex-
ploited the LLC replacement policy to influence eviction-
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decisions within a set, and enable a side-channel stealth-
ier than Prime+Probe or Flush+Reload. Mirage guarantees
global evictions with random replacement, that has no access-
dependent state. This ensures that an adversary cannot influ-
ence the replacement decisions via its accesses, making Mi-
rage immune to any such replacement policy attacks.
Cache-Occupancy Attacks: Mirage prevents an adversary
that observes an eviction, from gaining any information
about the address of an installed line. However, the fact
that an eviction occurred continues to be observable, sim-
ilar to prior works such as Scatter-Cache [45] and Hyb-
Cache [7]. Consequently, Mirage and these prior works, are
vulnerable to attacks that monitor the cache-occupancy of
a victim by measuring the number of evictions, like a re-
cent attack [36] that used cache-occupancy as a signature for
website-fingerprinting. The only known way to effectively
mitigate such attacks is static partitioning of the cache space.
In fact, Mirage can potentially provide a substrate for global
partitioning of the data-store that is more efficient than cur-
rent way/set partitioning solutions to mitigate such attacks.
We leave the study extending Mirage to support global parti-
tions for future work.
6 Mirage with Cuckoo-Relocation
The default design for Mirage consists of 6 extra ways / skew
(75% extra tags) that avoids SAE for well beyond the system
lifetime. If Mirage is implemented with fewer extra tags (e.g.
4 extra ways/skew or 50% extra tags), it can encounter SAE
as frequently as once in 0.16 seconds. To avoid an SAE even
if only 50% extra tags are provisioned in Mirage, we propose
an extension ofMirage that relocates conflicting lines to alter-
native sets in the other skew,much like Cuckoo Hashing [25].
We call this extension Cuckoo-Relocation.
6.1 Design of Cuckoo-Relocation
We explain the design of Cuckoo-Relocation using an exam-
ple shown in Figure 11. An SAE is required when an incom-
ing line (Line Z) gets mapped in both skews to sets that have
no invalid tags (Figure 11(a)). To avoid an SAE, we need an
invalid tag in either of these sets. To create such an invalid
tag, we randomly select a candidate line (Figure 11(b)) from
either of these sets and relocate it to its alternative location in
the other skew. If this candidate maps to a set with an invalid
tag in the other skew, the relocation leaves behind an invalid
tag in the original set, in which the line to be installed can be
accommodated without an SAE, as shown in Figure 11(c). If
the relocation fails as the alternative set is full, it can be at-
tempted again with successive candidates till a certain num-
ber of maximum tries, after which an SAE is incurred. For
Mirage with 50% extra tags, an SAE is infrequent even with-
out relocation (less than once in 100 million installs). So in
the scenario where an SAE is required, it is likely that other
sets have invalid tags and relocation succeeds.
(c) After Relocation
Invalid = 0
Inva
lid =
 0
A CB
Z
Line
Install
 (a) Before Relocation
Skew-1
Skew-2
 (b) Relocation
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Skew-2
D F
E
Invalid = 1
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Z
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Skew-1
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Valid Tag
Invalid Tag
Figure 11: Cuckoo Relocation, a technique to avoid an SAE
if Mirage is implemented with 50% extra tags.
6.2 Results: Impact of Relocation on SAE
For Mirage with 50% extra tags, the chance that a relocation
fails is approximately p= 1/sets per skew. This is because at
the time of an SAE (happens once in 100 million installs), it
is likely that the only full sets, are the ones that are currently
indexed (i.e. only 1 set per skew is full). For relocation to
fail for a candidate, the chance that its alternative set is full is
hence approximately p= 1/sets per skew. After n relocation
attempts, the chance that all relocation attempts fail and an
SAE is incurred, is approximately pn.
Table 5 shows the rate of SAE for Mirage with 50% extra
tags and Cuckoo-Relocation, as the maximum number of re-
location attempts is varied. Attempting relocation for up to
3 lines is sufficient to ensure that an SAE does not occur in
system-lifetime (SAE occurs once in 22000 years). We note
that attempting relocation for up to 3 lines can be done in the
shadow of a memory access on a cache-miss.
Table 5: Frequency of SAE in Mirage with 50% extra tags (4
extra ways/skew) as number of relocation attempts increase
Max Relocations 0 1 2 3
Installs per SAE 2×108 3×1012 4×1016 7×1020
Time per SAE 0.16 seconds 45 minutes 1.3 years 22,000 years
6.3 Security Implications of Relocation
For Mirage with 50% extra tags, upto 3 cuckoo relocation
are done in the shadow of memory access on a cache-miss.
A typical adversary, capable of only monitoring load latency
or execution time, gains no information about when or where
relocations occur as – (1) Relocations do not stall the proces-
sor or cause memory traffic, they only rearrange cache entries
within the tag-store; (2) A relocation occurs infrequently
(once in 100 million installs) and any resultant change in oc-
cupancy of a set has a negligible effect on the probability of
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an SAE. If a future adversary develops the ability to precisely
monitor cache queues and learn when a relocation occurs to
perceive a potential conflict, we recommend implementing
Mirage with a sufficient number of extra tags (e.g. 75% extra
tags) such that no relocations are needed in system lifetime.
7 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the impact of Mirage on cache
misses and system performance. As relocations are rare, we
observe that performance is virtually identical for both with
and without relocations. So, we discuss the key results only
for the default Mirage design (75% extra tags).
7.1 Methodology
Adopting a methodology similar to Scatter-Cache [45], we
use a simulator based on Intel Pintool [22] to model our
hardware modifications. We generate an execution trace of
1 billion instructions for each of the SPEC CPU2006 bench-
marks using a Pintool and feed it to a C++ based simulator
that models in-order cores, inclusive L1/L2 caches, a shared
LLC and DRAM. The parameters of our baseline are shown
in Table 6. As our baseline, we use a 16-way, 16MB shared
LLC, arranged in the Scatter-Cache organization (two skews
of 8 ways each). The LLC lookup latency in Scatter-Cache is
increased by 5 cycles to account for the QARMA-64 encryp-
tion. For Mirage, we increase the latency by an additional 1
cycle to account for the larger tag-store and FPTR lookup.
We use a total of 58 workloads, including all the 29 SPEC
CPU2006 benchmarks (each has 8 duplicate copies running
on 8 cores) and 29 mixed workloads (each has 8 randomly
chosen SPEC benchmarks).
Table 6: Baseline System Configuration
Processor and Last-level Cache
Core 8-cores, In-order Execution, 3.2GHz,
L1 and L2 Cache Per Core L1-32KB, L2-256KB, 8-way, 64B line-size
LLC (shared across all cores)
16MB, 16-way, 64B line-size, Random Repl.
Scatter-Cache with 2 skews, 8 ways/skew
24 cycle lookup + 5 cycles for QARMA-64
DRAMMemory-System
Bus frequency, tCAS-tRCD-tRP 800 MHz (DDR 1.6 GHz), 9-9-9 ns
DRAM Organization 2-channel (8-Banks each), 2KB Row-Buffer
7.2 Impact on Cache Misses
Table 7 shows the LLCMisses Per 1000 Instructions (MPKI)
for Mirage, Scatter-Cache, and a Non-Secure set-associative
design (using LRU replacement), averaged over each work-
load suite SpecInt, SpecFp and Mix. Mirage and Scatter-
Cache have near-identical number of misses, as both designs
randomize evictions. AlthoughScatter-Cache selects replace-
ment victims from a smaller subset of the cache compared
to Mirage, both designs adopt a similar randomized address
to set mapping, which dominates to ensure that both designs
have similar MPKI. Compared to a Non-Secure LLC, both
Mirage and Scatter-cache incur 2% extra misses on average
(0.2 MPKI extra on average) due to the randomized evictions.
We observe that randomization can both increase or decrease
conflict misses in different workloads – for example, Mirage
and Scatter-Cache adds up to 7% extra misses for mcf and
xalanc, while reducing misses by up to 30% for sphinx.
Table 7: Average LLC MPKI in Mirage vs Scatter-Cache
Workloads Non-Secure Scatter-Cache Mirage
SpecInt-12 10.79 11.23 11.23
SpecFp-17 8.82 8.51 8.51
Mix-29 9.52 9.97 9.98
All-58 9.58 9.80 9.81
7.3 Impact on Performance
Figure 12 shows the performance (measured as weighted
speedup in Instructions Per Cycle for a multi-program work-
load [37]) of Mirage normalized to Scatter-Cache. Mirage
has similar performance to Scatter-Cache across most work-
loads and suffers a slowdown of 0.3% on average. This
slowdown is mainly due to Mirage requiring one extra cy-
cle for LLC-accesses to lookup a larger tag-store (with 14
ways/skew) compared to Scatter-Cache (with 8-ways/skew).
Both designs have further slowdown compared to a non-
secure LLC – Mirage has a 2.5% slowdown, while Scatter-
Cache has 2.2% slowdown on average. This is because both
designs require 5 extra cycles to compute the QARMA-64
encryptor based set-mapping function (as studied in [45]),
that is not required in the non-secure LLC. This gap can
be reduced by faster encryption algorithms. For workloads
such as mcf or omnet, Mirage increases both the LLC misses
and access latency compared to a non-secure LLC and hence
causes from 6% to 8% slowdown. On the other hand, for
workloads such as sphinx, dealII and gcc, Mirage reduces
LLC-misses and improves performance by 4 to 18% versus
the non-secure LLC.
7.4 Sensitivity to Cache Size
Figure 13 shows the performance ofMirage and a non-secure
design for cache sizes of 2MB to 64MB, each normalized to
Scatter-Cache of the same size. As cache size increases, Mi-
rage remains within 0.4% of Scatter-Cache. However, slow-
down for Mirage and Scatter-Cache versus the non-secure
LLC, increases from 1% for a 2MB cache to 3.5% for a
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Figure 12: Performance of Mirage normalized to Scatter-Cache. Across 58 workloads, Mirage incurs negligible slowdown
(0.3%) compared to Scatter-Cache. Scatter-Cache itself is 2.2% slower than a Non-Secure LLC.
64MB cache. This is because larger caches have higher hit-
rates, which causes an increase in the latency of a cache-hit
(due to QARMA-64) to have a higher impact on the perfor-
mance.
Figure 13: Sensitivity of Performance to Cache-Size.
8 Cost Analysis
We analyze the latency, area, and power overheads of Mirage.
For this section, we distinguish the two versions of our design
as, Mirage (default design with 75% extra tags) and Mirage-
Lite (with 50% extra tags and relocation).
8.1 Impact on Lookup Latency
The lookup latency in Mirage is affected by a larger tag-store
and an extra mux to select the FPTR of a hitting way. Using
Cacti-6.0 [23] (that reports access time, energy, etc. for dif-
ferent cache organizations), with 32nm technology, we esti-
mate that adding up to 16 extra ways adds 0.2 ns delay and an
extra mux adds ~0.05ns. These delays can be accounted by
increasing the latency by 1 cycle compared to Scatter-Cache.
8.2 Impact on Area
The area overheads in Mirage are proportional to its stor-
age overheads due to (1) extra tag-entries, and (2) FPTR and
RPTR, the pointers between tag/data entries. This causes a
storage overhead of 15% for Mirage and 12% for Mirage-
Lite compared to Scatter-Cache as shown in Table 8. An
area-neutral performance comparison in Table 9 shows that
Mirage is 1.5% slower compared to Scatter-Cache with 18%
more capacity that has a similar area. Scatter-cache (SCv1)
itself needs 3% more storage compared to a non-secure LLC,
as it needs 40-bit tags versus 26-bit tags in a non-secure LLC.
Table 8: Storage Overheads in Mirage for 64B linesize
Cache Size Scatter-Cache Mirage Mirage-Lite
16MB 2 skews x 2 skews x 2 skews x
(16,384 Sets) 8 ways/skew 14 ways/skew 12 ways/skew
Tag
Entry
Tag-Bits 40 40 40
Status(V,D) 2 2 2
FPTR – 18 18
Bits/Entry 42 60 60
Tag Entries 262,144 458,752 393,216
Tag-Store Size 1344 KB 3360 KB 2880 KB
Data
Entry
Data-Bits 512 512 512
RPTR – 19 19
Bits/Entry 512 531 531
Data Entries 262,144 262,144 262,144
Data-Store Size 16,384 KB 16,992 KB 16,992 KB
Total Storage
17,728 KB 20,352 KB 19,872 KB
(100%) (115%) (112%)
The storage overhead ofMirage depends on cache linesize,
as the relative size of tag-store reduces with larger linesize.
While we use 64B linesize, Table 10 shows that 128B line-
size like IBM’s Power9 [46] or 256B reduces overheads to
3-7%.
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Table 9: Area-Neutral Slowdown for Mirage
Design Data-store Size Slowdown
Scatter-Cache 19MB 0%
Mirage 16MB 1.5%
Mirage-Lite 16MB 1.5%
Table 10: Storage overhead with different linesizes
Design 64 Bytes 128 Bytes 256 Bytes
Mirage 14.8% 7.4% 3.7%
Mirage-Lite 12.1% 6.1% 3.0%
8.3 Impact on Energy per Access
The larger tag-store in Mirage requires more energy to ac-
cess than Scatter-Cache. To estimate energy per access, we
use Cactii-6.0 with 32nm technology to calculate the energy
for accessing a 16-way and a 32-way tag-store, and interpo-
late the values for 28-way (Mirage) and 24-way tag stores
(Mirage-Lite). While the tag-store access has a modest in-
crease in energy versus Scatter-Cache, the data-store access
is unchanged as the design is similar. Overall, Mirage incurs
0.17 nJ and Mirage-Lite incurs 0.12 nJ more energy per ac-
cess compared to Scatter-Cache, as shown in Table 11. These
increases in energy are insignificant compared to the energy
of a DRAM access, that takes up to 3nJ/access [41].
Table 11: Energy per access (in nJ) for Mirage
Design Tag-Access Data-Access Total-Access
Scatter-Cache 0.11 0.50 0.61
Mirage 0.27 0.51 0.78
Mirage-Lite 0.22 0.51 0.73
9 Related Work
Cache design for reducing conflicts (for performance or secu-
rity) has been an active area of research. In this section, we
briefly describe the closely related proposals, comparing and
contrasting where appropriate.
9.1 Secure Caches with High Associativity
The concept of cache location randomization for guarding
against cache attacks was pioneered almost a decade ago,
with RPCache [42] and NewCache [43], for protecting L1
caches. Conceptually, such designs have an indirection-table
that is consulted on each cache-access, that allows map-
ping an address to any cache location. While such designs
can be implemented for L1-Caches, there are practical chal-
lenges when they are extended to large shared LLCs. For
instance, the indirection-tables themselves need to be pro-
tected from conflicts if they are shared among different pro-
cesses. While RPCache prevents this by maintaining per-
process tables for the L1 cache, such an approach does not
scale to the LLC that may be used by several hundred pro-
cesses at a time. NewCache avoids conflicts among table-
entries by using a Content-Addressable-Memory (CAM) to
enable a fully-associative design for the table. However,
such a design is not practical for LLCs, which have tens of
thousands of lines, as it would impose impractically high
power overheads. While Mirage also relies on indirection for
randomization, it eliminates conflicts algorithmically using
load-balancing techniques, rather than relying on per-process
isolation that requires OS-intervention, or impractical fully-
associative lookups and CAMs.
Phantom-Cache [38] is a recent design that installs an
incoming line in 1 of 8 randomly chosen sets in the cache,
each with 16-ways, conceptually increasing the associativity
to 128. However, this design requires accessing 128 locations
on each cache access to check if an address is in the cache
or not, resulting in an impractically high power overhead of
67% [38]. Moreover, this design is potentially vulnerable to
future eviction set discovery algorithms as it selects a victim
line from only a subset of the cache lines. In comparison,Mi-
rage provides the security of a fully-associative cache where
any eviction-set discovery is futile, with practical overheads.
HybCache [7] is a recent design providing fully-
associative mapping for a subset of the cache (1–3 ways),
to make a subset of the processes that map their data to this
cache region immune to eviction-set discovery. However, the
authors state that “applying such a design to an LLC or a
large cache in general is expensive” [7]. For example, imple-
menting a fully-associative mapping in 1 way of the LLC
would require parallel access to >2000 locations per cache-
lookup (that could increase cache power by >2500% extrapo-
lating results from Phantom-Cache). In contrast, Mirage pro-
vides security of a fully-associative design for the LLC with
practical overheads, while accessing only 24–28 locations
per lookup.
9.2 Alternative Designs for High Associativity
V-Way Cache [29], which is the inspiration for our design,
also uses pointer-based indirection and extra tags to reduce
set-conflicts – but it does not eliminate them. V-Way Cache
uses a set-associative tag-store, which means it is still vulner-
able to set-conflict based attacks, identical to a traditional set-
associative cache. Mirage builds on this design and incorpo-
rates skewed associativity and load-balancing skew-selection
to ensure set-conflicts do not occur in system-lifetime.
Z-Cache [33] increases associativity by generating a
larger pool of replacement candidates using a tag-store walk,
and performing a sequence of line-relocations to evict the
best victim. However, this design still selects replacement
candidates from a small number of resident lines (up to 64),
limited by the number of relocations it can perform at a time.
As a result, a few lines can still form an eviction set, which
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could potentially be learned by attacks. Whereas, Mirage se-
lects victims globally from all lines in the cache, eliminating
eviction-sets.
Indirect Index Cache [15] is a fully-associative design
that uses indirection to decouple the tag-store from data-
blocks, and has a tag-store designed as a hash-table with
chaining to avoid tag-conflicts. However, such a design in-
troduces variable latency for cache-hits and hence is not se-
cure. While Mirage also uses indirection, it leverages extra
tags and power of 2 choices based load-balancing, to provide
security by eliminating tag-conflicts and retaining constant
hit latency.
Cuckoo Directory [10] enables high associativity for
cache-directories by over-provisioning entries similar to
our work and using cuckoo-hashing to reduce set-conflicts.
SecDir [50] also applies cuckoo-hashing to protect direc-
tories from conflict-based attacks [49]. However, cuckoo-
hashing alone is insufficient for conflict-elimination. Such
designs impose a limit on the maximum number of cuckoo
relocations they attempt (e.g. 32), beyond which they still in-
cur an SAE. In comparison, load-balancing skew selection,
the primary mechanism for conflict-elimination in Mirage, is
more robust at eliminating conflicts as it can ensure no SAE
is likely to occur in system-lifetime with 75% extra tags.
9.3 Isolation-based Defenses for Set-Conflicts
Isolation based defenses attempt to preserve the victim lines
in the cache and prevent conflicts with the attacker lines.
Prior approaches have partitioned the cache by sets [5, 30]
or ways [18, 20, 42, 52] to isolate security-critical processes
from potential adversaries. However, such approaches result
in sub-optimal usage of cache space and are unlikely to scale
as the number of cores on a system grows (for example, 16-
way cache for a 64-core system). Other mechanisms explic-
itly lock security-critical lines in the cache [17, 42], or lever-
age hardware transactional memory [11] or replacement pol-
icy [47] to preserve security-critical lines in the cache. How-
ever, such approaches require the classification of security-
critical processes to be performed by the user or by the
Operating-System. In contrast to all these approaches, Mi-
rage provides robust and low-overhead security through ran-
domization and global evictions, without relying on partition-
ing or OS-intervention.
10 Conclusion
Shared LLCs are vulnerable to conflict-based attacks. Exist-
ing defenses that attempt to randomize the LLC, continue
to be broken with advances in eviction-set discovery algo-
rithms. We proposeMirage a principled defense against both
current and future attacks. Providing the illusion of a fully-
associative cache with random-replacement, Mirage has the
guarantee of always evicting a random line on a cache-
fill that leaks zero information, for 104 − 1017 years. Mi-
rage achieves this strong security with negligible slowdown
(0.3%) and modest area overhead (12-15%), compared to re-
cent work Scatter-Cache. More importantly,Mirage provides
safeguard against future advances in eviction-set discovery
algorithms.
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